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SECTION 119 OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND
PHELPS DODGE REDUCTION WORKS: A CASE
STUDY OF EPA INACTION
INTRODUCTION

Acid rain' and air pollution are problems of increasing concern in the
western United States. A 1985 study links sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions
to the acid rain problem.2 When dispersed into the atmosphere, SO 2
converts to acid sulfate, which contributes to acid rain.'
Copper smelters account for two thirds of SO 2 emissions in the intermountain region (from the Sierra crest to the continental divide) of the
United States." SO 2 emissions are not only linked to acid rain, but medical
evidence also indicates SO 2 and other copper smelter emissions affect
asthmatics living in areas surrounding the smelters.'
The problem is of particular concern in southeastern Arizona, where
the Phelps Dodge Reduction Works copper smelter is located. 6 Phelps
Dodge emitted over 600,000 tons of SO 2 in the past two years under a
waiver provision contained in the Clean Air Act.7 Sulfur dioxide emissions
affect not only the immediate area surrounding the smelter, but mountainous areas in New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming are believed to
be affected as well.'
Congress amended the Clean Air Act [CAA] in 1977 to include section
1. Acid rain can be rain, snow, or any other deposition that contains significant amounts of sulfuric
or nitric acid. It may also take the form of dry deposition of sulfuric and nitric acid contaminated
particles, which occurs most frequently in the drier climate of the western United States.
2. Oppenheimer, Epstein, and Yuhnke, Acid Deposition. Smelter Emissions, and the Linearity
Issue in the Western United States. 229 Sci. 859 (1985) [hereinafter Oppenheimer]. (Note however,
that the extent of the acidic deposition problem in the West is still undetermined. Scientists remain
in disagreement on this issue. See Roth, Blanchard, Harte, Michaels, and EI-Ashry, The American
West's Acid Rain Test, WoRLD RESOURCE INST., Res. Rpt. 1 (1985).)
3. Ember, Rain Sulfates in West Linked to Sulfur Emissions, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERINO NEWS,
Sept. 2, 1985, at 19.
4. Eckholm, DistantPollution Tied to Acid Rain, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1985. at 1i, col. 4.
5. See letter from Dean Sheppard, M.D. to Robert Yuhnke. Environmental Defense Fund (Jan.
2, 1986); Testimony from Gov. Bruce Babbitt to EPA during hearings on the Phelps Dodge NSO
application (Apr. 17, 1986); and letter from Gov. Babbitt to Lee M. Thomas, EPA (Mar. 27. 1986).
Faculty files, Natural Resources Center, University of New Mexico School of Law.
6. The Phelps Dodge smelter comprises the northern portion of the so called "Grey Triangle."
The Grey Triangle consists of copper smelters located in Douglas. Arizona- Nacozari, Sonora, Mex.;
and Cananea, Sonora, Mex. Air pollution from the area is an international environmental issue.
However, the international aspects of the Grey Triangle dispute are not within the scope of this
Comment.
7. 51 Fed. Reg. 13,085 (1986).
8. Oppenheimer, supra note 2.
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119, which authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] to
issue a nonferrous smelter order to eligible smelter operators. 9 A nonferrous smelter order [NSO] is a permit to defer compliance with state
limitations for S02 emissions. This Comment focuses on the Phelps Dodge
Douglas copper smelter and section 119 of the Clean Air Act. The Comment discusses the problems posed by section 119, using Phelps Dodge
to illustrate the ineffectiveness of EPA enforcement of air pollution control
under the Act.
BACKGROUND
Phelps Dodge Corporation owns Phelps Dodge Douglas Reduction
Works, a copper smelter located in Douglas, Arizona. Built in 1902, the
smelter is the fifth largest in the United States.'0 Two major air pollutants
regulated under the Clean Air Act, sulfur dioxide and particulate matter
[PM], are emitted from the Douglas Reduction Works smelting process.
Since it is an old smelter, it does not contain sufficient means of pollution
control to meet requirements of the Act. The smelter could meet pollution
control limitations by installing modem, expensive pollution control technology. "
The Environmental Protection Agency has the authority under the Clean
Air Act to promulgate uniform national ambient air quality standards
[NAAQS] for air pollutants, including SO2. 2 States are required to draft
a state plan for air pollution control, known as a State Implementation
Plan [SIP], for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of the
primary NAAQS. ' The SIP is subject to EPA approval.
Section 119 of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to-issue a nonferrous
smelter order to existing smelters that cannot comply with the state implementation plan."4 It was enacted to assist the ailing copper industry by
allowing out-dated smelters an additional ten. years to meet. Clean Air Act
standards for S02 emissions."
A smelter is eligible for an NSO if: 1) it existed prior to 1977; 2) it is
subject to an approved SIP for S02 emissions limitations; and 3) it can
9. 42 U.S.C. §7419 (1982).

10. The Phelps Dodge Douglas Smelter is currently closed. It closed on Jan. 15, 1987 under a
federal consent decree. Events leading to its closure are discussed in text accompanying notes 3233, infra.
1I. The Clean Air Act requires all smelters to comply with emissions control limitations by
January, 1988. To reduce SO2 emissions, a smelter must employ continuous pollution control technology, such as a sulfuric acid plant and a flash furnace. Many old smelters cannot afford such
expensive technology due to low copper prices and foreign competition in the market.
12. Section 109 of the Clean Air Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. §7409 (1982). The NAAQS level
for SO 2 is 365 ug/m'. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.5 (1986). The level for PM is 260 ug/m'. 40 C.F.R.
§ 50.6 (1986). Both levels refer to 24-hour periods, not to be exceeded more than once per year.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982).
14. 42 U.S.C. §7419(a)-(b) (1982).
15. See Legislative History of Clean Air Act Amendments, H.R. Ra. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 62-63, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEws 1077. 1140-41.
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demonstrate that no means of installing pollution controls are reasonably
available to meet SIP limitations at the time of the application.' 6 However,
the smelter must still meet emissions standards under the National Ambient Air Quality Standards during the application process. 7
In order to meet NAAQS levels during the NSO period, the smelter
must take interim measures for pollution control. The EPA administrator
shall determine such interim measures as may be necessary to ensure
compliance with NAAQS, to protect public health, and to compel smelters
to develop appropriate emission control teehnology. "
Applications for an NSO are filed wiih EPA or state environmental
authorities who may issue the permit subject to EPA approval. Phelps'
Dodge filed an application for a first-period NSO in June, 1980. ' The
state of Arizona granted the NSO in September, 1982, and submitted it
to EPA for final approval.2
Although Arizona initially approved the Phelps Dodge NSO application, it did not have an approved SIP at the time. Arizona had promulgated
SIP limitations for SO2 emissions on January 8, 1980. However, EPA
required a revision of the SIP, and final action approving the Arizona SIP
was not published in the Federal Register until January 14, nearly two
weeks after the first NSO period had already expired.2 '
By December, 1982, EPA had not acted on Phelps Dodge's NSO
application. The agency cited two reasons for its inaction: first, a United
States Court of Appeals vacated and remanded NSO regulations governing
eligibility requirements;' 2 and second, Arizona lacked an approved SIP.
Furthermore, it would not accept additional applications until secondperiod NSO regulations were developed and published. New regulations
were expected in early 1983.23.
16. 42 U.S.C. §7119(b) (1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. §7419(d)(1)(a) (1982).
18. Id.
19. A non-ferrous smelter order defers compliance with SIP limitations for SOI emissions until
Jan. 1, 1988. An NSO covers two five-year periods; the first-period expired on Jan. 1,1983, and
the second-period expires on Jan. I, 1988. 42 U.S.C. § 7419(c)(2) (1982).
20. This action initiates EPA's duty to approve or deny the NSO application. The agency has
ninety days to approve the state NSO. 42 U.S.C. §7419(a)(1)(B) (1982). (See infra text accompanying note 33).
21. 48 Fed. Reg. 1,717 (1983). See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. R-9-3-515 c.1.-9 (1980) for SIP
provisions on SO,emissions.
22. In Kennecott v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1982) the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held the closure test in the first-period NSO regulations was inconsistent with statutory
mandate. The closure test "compares the net revenues a smelter would receive from its operations
after installing constant controls with salvage value upon closure. Constant controls are deemed
'reasonably available' if the smelter... would elect to continue operation, rather than close down."
Id. at 1.011. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend a closure or shutdown test in determining
eligibility, and remanded the case to EPA to promulgate a new test.
23. See Letter from David P. Howecamp, Acting Director, Air Management Division, EPA, to
James E. Sam, Director, Arizona Department of Health Services (Dec. 17, 1982), on file with the
Arizona Department of Health Services.
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Regulations governing the second NSO period were not published,
however, until February 2, 1985.2' Phelps Dodge filed a letter of intent
to apply for a second NSO on March 14, 1985. Under the new regulations,
compliance with the SIP for S02 emissions is suspended for sixty days
after filing a letter of intent.' Once EPA receives a "substantially completed" application,' the SIP for $O, emissions limitations is suspended
for an additional ninety days, pending EPA review of the application."
EPA may continue the ninety-day extensions indefinitely for good cause
at the EPA administrator's discretion.2 Phelps Dodge filed its second
NSO application on May 15, 1985. EPA deemed the application substantially completed, but also requested additional information for evaluation.
Deficiencies in the Phelps Dodge application resulted in several ninetyday extensions through April 10, 1986, nearly a year after the initial
application was filed.29 On April 10, 1986, EPA proposed to deny the
application. However, it ultimately granted an additional ninety-day extension in order to negotiate a consent decree with Phelps Dodge."
In the meantime, concerned citizens and environmental groups filed
suits against EPA and Phelps Dodge." While these suits were not entirely
successful, they reflect citizens' concern to enforce federal and state
pollution control standards.
Phelps Dodge's final extension terminated on July 9, 1986. EPA still
had not taken final action on the NSO application. However, on July 10,
1986, EPA temporarily closed the smelter down for failure to meet the
SIP, and the state of Arizona denied Phelps Dodge's application for a
1986 operating permit. The Justice Department subsequently filed an
action in federal district court claiming relief for alleged violations of the
CAA and the SIP.32
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

50 Fed. Reg. 6,434 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §57).
40 C.FR. §57.202(a) (1986).
EPA does not define "substantially completed." See infra text accompanying note 46.
40 C.F.R. § 57.202(b) (1986).
Id.
Notice of extensions were published in 50 Fed. Reg. 47,841 (1985), 51 Fed. Reg. 1.294

(1986), and 51 Fed. Reg. 5,401 (1986).
30. 51 Fed. Reg. 13,085 (1986).
31. A 1984 case, Environmental Defense Fund. Inc. v. Phelps Dodge, et al., No. 84-932 (D.
Ariz. Nov. 28, 1984) sought to compel compliance with the Arizona SIP. This suit was stayed in
the District Court, Tucson Division. and is currently closed. Kamp v. Hemandez, 752 F.2d 1444
(9th Cir. 1985) challenged EPA's approval of the Arizona SIP. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed EPA's action. A third case, Environmental Defense Fund v. Lee M. Thomas, et al., No.
85-1244, (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1985) challenged SIP suspensions under section 119. The case was
dismissed.
32. United States v. Phelps Dodge Corporation, No. 86-424 (D. Ariz. July 29, 1986). The state
of Arizona intervened in the suit against Phelps Dodge.
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EPA, the State of Arizona, and Phelps Dodge drafted a consent decree
under the authority of the Arizona Department of Health Services which
allowed Phelps Dodge to continue smelting until January 15, 1987. The
consent decree provided that: 1) Phelps Dodge withdraw its NSO application and never file again; 2) Phelps Dodge pay a civil penalty for
past violations of the CAA; and 3) the state of Arizona would issue a
1986 operating permit that allowed Phelps Dodge to continue operation
at the Douglas smelter under an Interim Period Compliance Program until
January 15, 1987, at which time it would cease smelting permanently.33
In total, SIP suspensions on SO 2 emissions limitations continued for
sixteen months after Phelps Dodge filed its letter of intent to apply for
an NSO. As will be shown later, EPA granted suspensions even though
Phelps Dodge never really demonstrated a genuine good faith effort to
complete its application. Furthermore, EPA itself appeared to be "stonewalling" the application process in a manner which hindered the legislative goal of protecting the public health.
DISCUSSION
When the second-period NSOs expire on January 1, 1988, a gaping
loophole created in the Clean Air Act for the nonferrous smelting industry
will be closed. The loophole is the consequence of serious weaknesses
in section 119, deficiencies which are well illustrated by the Phelps Dodge
experience. First, section 119 fails to require specific time limits for EPA
approval of the NSO application. Second, it permits broad agency discretion in suspending SO emission limits during EPA review.3 A discussion of these problems and a look toward the future of section 119
follows.
No Time Limits for Granting an NSO
There is only one express time limit mentioned in section 119. A smelter
may file an application with EPA or with the state in which the smelter
is located. In the latter case, EPA has ninety days to determine whether
the state order is in accordance with requirements of the Act.35 There are
33. Notice for the proposed Consent Order was published in the Federal Register on Aug. 8,
1986, pending a thirty day period for public comment. 51 Fed. Reg. 28,634 (1986). The parties
filed a Final Consent Order in United States v. Phelps Dodge, No. 86-424 (D. Ariz. July 29, 1986),
on Oct. 20, 1986. The Environmental Defense Fund has intervened in the suit as an independent

party to enforce the decree.
34, In the writer's opinion, the nature of section 119 gives EPA too much discretion in extending
suspensions on SOz limitations. However. the abuse of agency discretion is a separate question based

on an arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.
35. 42 U.S.C. §7419(aX1)(B) (1982).
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no parallel time limits imposed on EPA if an application is filed directly
with the agency.
The statute is supplemented by EPA's rules and regulations implementing section 119, which contain additional time restraints.' For instance, EPA's first-period NSO regulations provide for an initial ninetyday suspension of SIP emissions limitations for SO2 after the smelter files
a letter of intent to apply for an NSO. 3 '
The agency's policy toward time limits is best revealed in its promulgation of final rules on first-period NSOs. 31 In response to a comment39
that the time given for the completion of an NSO application should not
be limited to ninety days in all cases, EPA agreed that there may be an
"occasional situation" in which more time for completion is justified.'"
EPA added that the period should be "as short as possible," and extensions
should occur "only in unusual circumstances.""' It concluded that, in
most instances, ninety days was sufficient to complete an application.
Rules for second-period NSOs contained essentially the same language
as first-period NSOs. '2 However, in response to a comment from the
Environmental Defense Fund encouraging a limitation of SIP suspensions
to 180 days, EPA stated that a "reasonable period of time" is necessary
to complete the application process. It then concluded that "[tin order
for these regulations to be properly implemented, a period of up to 180
days or more after an application may be required."" 3
These second-period comments reflect a more lenient view toward time
limitations than the comments on first-period NSOs. In fact, according
to the agency's current practice, there are no real time limits for granting
an NSO application. As evidenced by the Phelps Dodge application and
others filed with EPA, the application could be pending indefinitely."
36. 45 Fed. Reg. 42.514 (1980) (codified at40 C.F.R. §57).
37, 40 C.F.R. § 57.202(a) (1986),
38. 45 Fed. Reg. 42.528 (1980). Section II,Sub-part B.
39. A fundamental requirement in any agency rulemaking process is to provide public notice and
comment. Under this requirement, the agency must provide notice of proposed rules in the Federal
Register with a period for public comment. The agency responds to public commentary when it
issues its final rules. These rules are also published in the Federal Register.
40. 45 Fed. Reg. 42,528 (1980).
41. Id.
42. The only significant difference between first-period NSO regulations and second-period regulations is the latter allows a sixty-day initial suspension of the SIP limitations on S02 after filing
an application. Compare 45 Fed. Reg. 42,538-42,539 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§57.20157.203 (1986) with 50 Fed. Reg. 6.451-6,452 (1985) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §57).
43. 50 Fed. Reg. 6,442 (1985).
44. The Phelps Dodge application was pending for nearly a year and a half before EPA took final
action. The Magma Copper Company, another Arizona smelter, filed an NSO application prior to the
May 15, 1985 deadline. However, Magma filed with both the state of Arizona and EPA. Its application
is still pending. Such delays are contrary to legislative intent. A report from the House Sub-committee
on Health and Environment indicates that when Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1977. it did
not intend to allow smelter extensions to continue indefinitely. See H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong.,
IstSess. 62, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws. 1077, 1140.
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EPA's Discretion in Suspending the SIP for S0 2 Emissions
EPA discretion to suspend the SIP further exacerbates the problem
caused by the lack of statutory or regulatory time limits governing the
application process. There is no enforcement of SIP limitations on SO2
emissions during the suspension period. While the smelter still assumes
legal liability for violations of the NAAQS for SO, EPA may continue
to defer SIP emissions limitations on SO 2 for good cause at the discretion
of the administrator upon receipt of a substantially completed application.' Rules governing second-period NSOs, codified at 40 C.F.R. section
57.202(b)(1) state:
Receipt of all parts of a substantially completed application ... shall
be deemed to continue the suspension of the SIP limitation for S02
until the issuing agency issues or declines to issue an NSO. The
suspension shall in all cases terminate, however, ninety days after
receipt of the substantially completed application, unless extended
for good cause at the discretion of the administrator. If ... [a] good
faith effort has been made to submit a completed application, additional time may be granted to allow for correction of minor deficiencies.
EPA does not include an interpretation of such key phrases as "substantially completed application," "good cause," and "good faith effort" to
complete an application. As a result, the agency has broad discretion in
deciding to extend an application. The following review of second-period
NSO regulations and Phelps Dodge's second application illustrates the
problem of suspending SIP limitations at the agency's discretion..
As mentioned before,' an existing smelter may be eligible for an NSO
if there are no reasonably available means for installing pollution control
devices to meet SIP limitations on SO2 emissions. Regulations for secondperiod NSOs provide two financial tests for judging reasonable availability: the Rate of Return Test, and the Profit Protection Test.47 Passing
either test is sufficient to establish financial eligibility because it demonstrates that the smelter cannot afford to install pollution control devices."
In addition to financial eligibility, a smelter must show that it can meet
NAAQS during the term of the NSO. 9 To do so, the smelter must submit:
1) an approvable supplementary control system to anticipate and prevent
45. 40 C.F.R.

§57.202(b).

46. See infra text accompanying n. 17.

47. Phelps Dodge applied under the Rate of Return Test. This test compares a smelter's estimated
rate of return earned on the book value of the net investment on pollution control technology with
the required rate of return for the non-ferrous industry. A smelter passes the test if. after taking into

account the cost of constant pollution control technology, it would earn less than the industry's
required rate of return on capital. MIFed. Reg. 13,086 (1986).
48. 51 Fed. Reg. 10,211 (1986).
49. 42 U.S.C. §7419(d) (1982).
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violations of the NAAQS; 2) a workplan for evaluation and control of
fugitive (non-stack) emissions; and 3) a plan to comply with monitoring
and reporting requirements."
A supplementary control system [SCS] is "a dispersion technique which
does not reduce stack emissions of pollutants to the atmosphere, but rather
varies emissions over time according to meteorological conditions."' If
a smelter already has an SCS in operation at the time of the application,
as Phelps Dodge did, it must include a description of the SCS and its
operations manual in the application. Additionally, it must include a
specific plan for development of an adequate SCS if the current system
does not meet NAAQS requirements. 2
Phelps Dodge filed an application for a second NSO on May 15, 1985.
Among the deficiencies in Phelps Dodge's application was the lack of
an SCS development plan." In a letter dated September 18, 1985, EPA
notified Phelps Dodge that its SCS did not comply with applicable regulations.' EPA also notified Phelps Dodge in the same letter that it failed
to show that its fugitive emissions did not contribute to NAAQS exceedances. For these reasons, EPA allowed Phelps Dodge to amend its
application, and it granted a ninety-day extension."
Despite the deficiencies in the application, EPA accepted it as "substantially completed." 56 Section 3.2 of EPA's Proposed Report and Findings on Financial Eligibility for Phelps Dodge's second NSO application
states:
EPA first determined that Phelps Dodge submitted a substantially
completed application in terms of schedules, exhibits, and major
components of the supporting information. For several topics, additional information and clarification ... would have been desirable:

however, EPA was able to determine financial eligibility by applying
various scenarios based on conservative assumptions.5 7
The above report indicates EPA may make an initial determination of
financial eligibility based on the information submitted. However, EPA
never clearly defines the requirements for a substantially completed application. Thus, a smelter may file an application lacking critical infor50. 50 Fed. Reg. 6,434 (1985).
51. 51 Fed. Reg. 13,091 (1986) at n. 3.
52. 40 C.FR. §57.405(a)(3) (1986).
53. See Section II C of EPA's proposed denial, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,086-88 (1986).
54. 51 Fed. Reg. 13,087 (1986).
55. 50 Fed. Reg. 47,841 (1985).
56. See Section 11B of EPA's proposed denial, 51 Fed. Reg. 13,086 (1986).
57. Unpublished agency report. Faculty files, Nat. Resources Center, University of New Mexico
School of Law.
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mation only to postpone the application process. If accepted, EPA then
requests additional data to complete the application.
If EPA had not deemed Phelps Dodge's application substantially completed, it could have denied the application." A denial would allow for
enforcement of SO2 emissions limitations at the state and local levels. 59
This would have forced Phelps Dodge to comply with S02 emissions
limitations in accordance with its SIP. Instead, EPA accepted the application, thus triggering delays of up to sixteen months before taking final
action.
The problem of filing a substantially completed application is directly
related to the good faith standard in completing the application process.
After EPA initially determined Phelps Dodge's application was substantially complete, it allowed the company to amend its application. EPA
instructed Phelps Dodge to submit a specific SCS development plan. In
its response to EPA, Phelps Dodge did not propose such a plan. It proposed
instead to "undertake a statistical analysis of historical air quality and
meterological data... after issuance of the NSO." "
EPA also informed Phelps Dodge that the company did not adequately
demonstrate that its fugitive emissions did not contribute to NAAQS
exceedances. Phelps Dodge responded with a modeled impact study of
fugitive emissions on air quality. Its model predicted ambient concentrations of S02 "approaching fifty times the twenty-four hour standard." 6 '
Thus, Phelps Dodge could not have complied with NAAQS as the Act
requires.
In proposing to deny the Phelps Dodge amended application; EPA cited
as many as ten instances in which Phelps Dodge failed to meet the
requirements on the SCS issue, and five instances of failure to meet
fugitive emissions requirements.' Phelps Dodge has a history of nineteen
NAAQS exceedances in 1984, and five in 1985. 6" Indeed, Phelps Dodge
"failed to comply with ambient standards in every year for which data
are available since 1975, except 1982 when the smelter was shut down. "4
58. EPA has the discretion to approve or deny an NSO application under 42 US.C. § 7419(b)
(1982).
59. A state has the authority to enforce compliance with its SIP under Section 110 of the Clean
Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §7410 (1982). The Act also allows citizens' suits under Section 304 to seek
enforcement of emissions standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).
60. 51 Fed. Reg. 13,090 (1986).
61. Id.
62. See Technical Support Document for the Proposed Decisionl on Phelps Dodge's Application
for Non-Ferrous Smelter Order, unpublished appendix to 51 Fed. Reg. 13,085 (1986). Faculty files.
Natural Resources Center, University of New Mexico School of Law.
63. 51 Fed. Reg. 13,090 (1986).
64. Request for Denial of Operating Permit and Public Hearing, In Re-Application for Renewal
of the Operating Permit for the Phelps Dodge Douglas Smelter, Before the Arizona Dept. of Health
Services (Aug. 1, 1985) at 5.
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One could conclude from these facts, when considered together with
Phelps Dodge's consistent recalcitrance during EPA review," that Phelps
Dodge did not exercise good faith in completing its NSO application. If
so, EPA could not continue suspensions on S02 limitations based on
Phelps Dodge's good faith. Furthermore, 40 C.F.R. section 57.202(b)(1)
allows for additional time, based on a good faith effort to submit a
completed application, for correction of minor deficiencies. Phelps Dodge's
failure to submit an SCS workplan and failure to show its fugitive emissions do not contribute to NAAQS exceedances do not appear to be minor
deficiencies.'
The root of the problem of agency discretion under section 119 is the
concept of "good cause." Despite deficiencies in the Phelps Dodge application, EPA continued SIP suspensions on SO2 limitations for "good
cause." 6' Good cause is not defined in the Clean Air Act, and there is
no case law defining the term in this context. The only apparent justification EPA gives for extending Phelps Dodge's application is "the volume
and complexity" of application information." The NSO application is
voluminous and complex. However, such complexity provides more reason to require the most accurate and complete information as possible
upon filing the application. This would facilitate EPA's determination to
either grant or deny the NSO. Instead, EPA is allowed to prolong the
process under the "relative and highly abstract term" good
application
69
cause.

Future Considerations
Second-period NSOs expire on January 1, 1988, thus requiring all
smelters to comply with constant control technology requirements of the
Clean Air Act by the beginning of next year. The legislative history on
section 119 indicates Congress felt that ten years was sufficient to develop
appropriate technology to meet CAA standards." However, Congress may
extend section 119 if it concludes further extensions are necessary."
65. Conversation with Mr. Cliff Metzner, former State Department negotiator for the United States
in the Grey Triangle negotiations (Oct. 1986). Mr. Metzner commented that Phelps Dodge's lack
of cooperation with EPA delayed its NSO application. Meanwhile, negotiations for an agreement
between Mexico and the United States to control air pollution put pressure on EPA to bring Phelps
Dodge into compliance with the Clean Air Act.
66. See also unpublished appendix to 51 Fed. Reg. 13,085 (1986). Faculty files, Natural Resources
Center, University of New Mexico School of Law.
67. 51 Fed. Reg. 5401 (1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 1,294 (1986), 50 Fed. Reg. 47,841 (1985).
68. See 51 Fed. Reg. 1295 (1986). and 51 Fed. Reg. 5402 (1986),
69. Wray v. Folsum 166 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. Ark. 1958). (Although this is not an environmental
law case, it provides a source of judicial construction of the term "good cause.")
70. H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 63, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1141.
71. Id.
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Section 119 has served its purpose of allowing smelters that were in
existence before 1977 an additional ten years to meet constant pollution
control requirements. However, it has not served the goal of the Clean
Air Act: to protect public health, and to attain and maintain clean air.
Section 119 is no longer needed. 72 EPA has not granted a single NSO
application in the western United States for the past five years. Most
smelters have now installed sufficient pollution control technology to meet
standards under the Act. Some, such as Phelps Dodge, have chosen to
close down operations. 73 Others, such as the Magma Copper Company,
shall continue operating under a proposed consent decree which would
require the smelter to come into compliance with particulate matter and
S02 State implementation plan limitations by November 1, 1988. 74
CONCLUSION
Section 119 of the Clean Air Act was promulgated to grant existing
non-ferrous smelters a deferral giving existing smelters additional time
to comply with Clean Air Act emissions standards. Yet, given the EPA's
practice, section 119 essentially has resulted in a blanket exemption from
compliance with SIP emissions limits for S02. Sulfur dioxide limitations
are suspended at the administrator's discretion for good cause upon filing
a substantially completed application and upon a good faith effort to
complete the application process. EPA does not clearly define the key
language in these provisions. As a result, the administrator has broad
discretion to extend suspensions, leaving no SIP to enforce SO 2 limitations.
Congress should not extend section 119 in 1988. Smelters should not
be allowed to continue violating state and federal emissions control standards. The goal of the Clean Air Act, as Congress reiterated when it
passed the 1977 amendments to the Act, is to protect public health and
clean the nation's air. Section 119 has disserved this goal.
THOMAS U. WHITE
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